INTRODUCTION
The World Trade Organization (WTO) was created in 1994 after the conclusion of the Uruguay round of negotiations under the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) by the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization. 1 The GATT was transformed into a powerful international institution, the WTO. The WTO supervises the implementation of international rules on trade liberalisation, and also serves as a negotiating forum for further liberalisation. Its mandate extends beyond that of the GATT into areas such as liberalisation of trade in services as well as the protection of intellectual property rights.
In the Pacific, Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and, as of 2007, Tonga, are WTO members. The current members, apart from Tonga, were so at the time of the transformation of the GATT into the WTO. Samoa and Vanuatu have observer status. Timor Leste, Nauru, Tuvalu, Palau, Kiribati, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands currently have no official relationship with the WTO.
The theory of comparative advantage provides the theoretical underpinning for the raison d'être of the WTO: the promotion of free trade. According to that theory, states should concentrate on producing what they are best at, to avoid generating opportunity costs and consequent economic inefficiency. States should produce and export those goods, and import other goods. The concurrent removal of trade barriers generates greater global economic efficiency, with all states providing to others the things that they are best at producing. Greater global efficiency should generate greater global wealth.
Greater global wealth in turn should alleviate poverty and enhance the ability of states to implement human rights, especially economic, social and cultural rights like the right to an adequate standard of living, or the right to an adequate standard of health care. 2 Wealth generation should assist in promoting economic development, an important aspect of the right to development recognised in the Declaration of the Right to Development 1986. 3 The alleviation of poverty itself may be characterised as the remedying of human rights abuse. 4 Nevertheless, social justice and human rights concerns regarding the WTO are real and substantial. In Part II, I address concerns regarding an apparent democratic deficit within the WTO, whereby the generation of its rules are impacted by a biased process. Procedural biases have led to substantive iniquities within WTO rules, some of which are addressed in Part III, which concerns the impact of WTO rules on poverty and development within developing states. Part IV concludes the paper. Throughout this paper, I will also comment specifically on ramifications for the Pacific Islands.
II DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 5

A Negotiating Process
Even in democratic states, the peoples of GATT/WTO members are rarely well informed of the negotiating process within the WTO, despite its potential to have profound effects on their livelihoods. 6 Those who are detrimentally affected by GATT/WTO rules rarely, if ever, have access to procedures of redress after a state's accession. 7 Having said that, Tonga's accession was delayed by 18 months to facilitate greater public consultation than had occurred while it worked out the particulars of its accession deal. 8 While that process of consultation delayed Tonga's membership, it did not result in Tonga joining on substantively different terms than had been available 18 months earlier. Vanuatu, which was set to join the WTO in 2002 after concluding its Accession Protocol in 2001, backed away, and wants a substantive renegotiation of the terms of its accession, which may allow for greater public input if it should occur. 9 No renegotiation has yet taken place, and there is no indication from the WTO that it will occur.
GATT and WTO agreements have historically been negotiated in closed sessions by government trade specialists. 10 Other governmental personnel in, for example, the labour sector, have not been involved. Amongst non-government organisations (NGOs), commercial interests have been uniquely represented. 11 As multinational corporations dominate world trade, the dismantling of trade barriers clearly enhances their interests. Given their undoubted global power, the WTO negotiation process may serve to unduly enhance that power. 12 Systemic disadvantages within the negotiating culture of the WTO are of special concern, as the final rules are essentially framed by the negotiated outcomes. All WTO members are expected to adhere to the entire "package deal" arising from negotiations. 22 Reservations, 23 delayed ratification, or even non-ratification, are not recognised as legitimate options for WTO members. It is not presently expected that such options will be made available in new negotiations.
The negotiating disadvantage for acceding states, particularly small developing nations such as Vanuatu, Tonga and Samoa, in negotiating to join the WTO, are worse that those experienced by developing states during the Uruguay Round. As noted below, acceding states have generally been required to accept more onerous undertakings than existing members, without reciprocal guarantees. Existing WTO members have a right of veto to hold as a bargaining chip. While a weaker member might be bullied or otherwise persuaded to abstain from its use, an acceding member, particularly one with a weak economy, has few if any bargaining chips at all. An acceding state will also have comparatively little negotiating experience in the WTO milieu, and will find itself pitted against experienced trade negotiators from major economic powers, who are largely concerned with extracting the best deal possible for their own country or with establishing favourable negotiating precedents for the future, rather than with the development needs of the acceding state. 24
B Dispute Settlement Process
The WTO's Dispute Settlement System (DSS) is a very powerful international dispute system; there is a remarkable level of compliance with its findings. A member who wins a dispute may impose economic countermeasures against the defeated member if the latter fails to comply with the ruling. This threat of economic punishment seems to motivate greater compliance than the threat of international censure, the only "punishment" that generally arises in the case of disobedience of the rulings of other international bodies, such as the International Court of Justice. There are a number of concerns over aspects of the decision-making process within the DSS. Hearings within the DSS are closed to the public unless all parties consent. Decisions are made at first instance by trade experts, which can again lead to the subordination of non-trade interests to trade interests. 25 Even so, international law outside the subject matter of trade is not ignored in the decision-making process. International customary law is relevant to the application of WTO norms 26 but customary norms will not displace WTO norms unless they classify as jus cogens norms. 27 Non-WTO treaties may be taken into account in interpreting WTO agreements, 28 but Panels do not have to do so unless all WTO members are party to a particular treaty. 29 Therefore, non-trade rules may have only a minor role, or may even have no role, in the determination of a dispute, regardless of the dispute's non-trade impact. 30 As with the negotiating process, private commercial interests have been uniquely represented in dispute settlements. While only members have standing to initiate dispute settlement proceedings, private companies have propelled the initiation of numerous cases. 31 For example, the dispute between the United States and Japan regarding Japan's treatment of imported film paper is more commonly known as the Kodak/Fuji case, which reflects the private interests that drove that litigation. 32 The participation of other NGOs is far less influential. Panels may accept amicus briefs from third party private organisations, such as civil society organisations. 33 obligation to accept such briefs, nor do they necessarily take account of them in rendering decisions. 34 Developed nations again have significant advantages within the DSS. The economic countermeasures imposed by developed against developing countries can have a devastating effect, but the same is rarely true in the reverse situation. 35 The process of mounting a case before the WTO also requires monetary resources and technical knowledge, which developing states may lack. 36 Of the Pacific Island member states, Fiji has been involved as a third party in three disputes involving export subsidies on sugar, 37 while the other three nations have had, at the time of writing, no involvement in the dispute settlement processes. It is perhaps a good sign that no state has seen fit to bring a complaint against the Pacific Island states. On the other hand, their lack of engagement with the process may indicate that it is largely inaccessible due to a relevant lack of expertise or resources.
C Democratic Deficits and Human Rights
Despite improvements in WTO processes, they remain biased in favour of interests of exporters and those of developed nations. 38 This jeopardises, respectively, non-trade interests (including human rights) and the interests of developing nations if they should conflict with those aforementioned interests, especially given the disproportionate strength of the WTO regime compared to other global regimes. Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 39 guarantees the right to political participation, and has been interpreted to incorporate rights to participate in "all aspects of public administration, and the formulation of policy at the international, national, regional and local levels". 40 is also a key component of the right to development in Article 1 of the Declaration on the Right to Development. Participatory rights therefore apply at a global level, though the scope of the global aspect of the right is underdeveloped. 41 The Human Rights Committee (HRC), the body created to monitor the implementation of the ICCPR, has conceded that Article 25 is satisfied if citizens indirectly participate in public affairs through elected representatives. 42 Arguably, citizens (at least in democratic states) participate in WTO processes through trade representatives appointed by their elected governments. Participatory rights must also be enjoyed on a non-discriminatory basis, in accordance with rights of nondiscrimination. 43 The limited range of interests represented by WTO negotiators and the disproportionate influence of business groups, coupled with the general lack of input by historically marginalised groups such as the poor, women 44 and indigenous peoples, 45 all raise questions regarding the adequacy of the level of indirect participation in WTO negotiations and decisionmaking.
Inadequate processes are likely to generate unsatisfactory substantive outcomes, which could undermine the enjoyment of other human rights. Therefore, I turn now to examine the substance of particular WTO rules in areas of relevance to developing states, such as the Pacific Island nations. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 51 was a new agreement introduced in the Marrakesh Agreement. The most prominent human rights concerns with GATS have been that liberalisation in essential services, such as the provision of water and other utilities, health care, or education, could restrict the ability of states to subsidise and regulate the supply of such services, which could in turn deny the poor access to the essential services, such as the provision of water and education, that they need in order to enjoy economic social and cultural rights. This issue is of greater concern for developing states, where there is more poverty and less capacity to provide protection of economic and social rights. 52 Furthermore, greater liberalisation has arisen regarding the types of services where developed states have a comparative advantage than comparable services for the developing states. 53 Developing states faced greater transitional costs in properly implementing the various WTO agreements. 56 For Tonga, Samoa and Vanuatu (if the latter two join the WTO), these costs will add to costs incurred during the time-consuming and painstaking accession process. For example, Vanuatu reported that its accession process cost US$150,000 in administration and travel. Observer status costs US$20,000 per year. By 2003, it owed the WTO US$170,000, which amounted to the entire annual budget of its Department of Trade. 57 Finally, developing states conceded the creation of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 58 which requires WTO members to protect intellectual property rights. Most intellectual property rights are held in the developed world, and they have maintained their comparative advantage in technological innovation. 59 TRIPS has therefore led to a regressive transfer of wealth from the developing world to the developed world. 60 The poor in the developing world have no capacity to exploit intellectual property rights, and cannot afford the price increases generated by the monopoly rights mandated by TRIPS. Higher prices obstruct access to goods which are essential for the enjoyment of human rights, such as life-saving medicines. 61 The main concessions by developed states in the Marrakesh Agreement were to accede to the Agreement on Agriculture 62 and the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, 63 which addressed trade 54 It must be noted that India is now having significant success in providing telecommunications services for offshore investors. issues of particular significance to developing states. However, both Agreements allow for massive protectionism. 64 Indeed, it was estimated in 2005 that developed states imposed tariffs on goods from developing states that were on average three to four times higher than those imposed on goods from other developed states. 65 The special development needs of developing states are recognised in WTO provisions allowing for "special and differential treatment" (SDT). For example, developed states may offer preferential market access to developing states under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). 66 Developing states were given more time to implement certain WTO agreements, though most of those longer timelines have now expired. Finally, "trade aid" should be provided to developing states by developed states. However, the most important SDT provisions are only exhortatory rather than binding: developed states do not have to offer trade aid nor do they have to offer preferential market access to developing states. 67 As Professor Thomas Cottier has noted, SDT provisions have had little impact on addressing the "real needs" of developing states. 68 Finally, the accession processes 69 are of special concern to the many Pacific Islands that were not WTO members at the time of its creation (including those who are still not members). The accession process itself is extremely onerous, as the prospective new member must essentially satisfy each of the members of a working party established for its accession: any WTO member can join such a working party. 70 Incumbent members have exploited accession processes to impose onerous conditions on acceding members, which they do not need to reciprocate. 71 Furthermore, these conditions can set precedents for future members, who may face even more onerous requirements. For example, Oxfam has suggested that the proposed conditions for Samoa are worse than the "bad deal" received by Cambodia, which acceded in 2004. 72 The precedent value of accession deals also explains why harsh requirements are extracted from small vulnerable economies such as those in the Pacific Islands by states, such as the United States, that hardly trade with them: those precedents are perceived as valuable for future negotiations with states with significant economies such as Russia. 73 Conditions for new members can include additional obligations, not imposed under existing WTO rules ("WTO+" conditions), as well as a loss of concessions that a State would normally be entitled to under WTO rules ("WTO-" conditions). 74 As an example of a WTO+ requirement, Tonga had to commit to liberalising a large number of services, even though GATS permits states to choose which services they will open up to foreign competition. 75 Under Vanuatu's Accession Protocol, it committed to opening up "over four times the average number of sub-sectors for LDC Members at the time." 76 Tonga has an average tariff binding of 35 per cent, which is much lower than most comparable developing states. 77 Regarding WTO conditions, Tonga became fully bound by TRIPS as of 1 January 2008, so there was virtually no delay in full implementation, even though all developing states benefited from timelines to facilitate implementation in the original Marrakesh Agreement. Vanuatu's Accession Protocol commits it to comply fully with TRIPS within two years, and to waive transitional periods for the Agreement of Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS). 78 Vanuatu is a designated "Least Developed Country" (LDC). Regarding TRIPS, LDCs do not have to guarantee patent protection on drugs until 2016. 79 Regarding TRIMS, the transitional period for TRIMS for LDCs was extended under the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration for a period of seven years. 80 It is not however clear whether Vanuatu, despite its LDC status, will benefit from either rule under the terms of its Accession Protocol.
III WTO RULES, FREE TRADE AND DEVELOPING STATES
The General Council of the WTO 81 issued a decision in early 2003 on the Accession of LeastDeveloped Countries in which it urged WTO members to "exercise restraint in seeking concessions and commitments on trade in goods and services from acceding LDCs". 82 The General Council also stated that SDT, including special transitional arrangements for LDCs, should be made available to any acceding LDC. 83 This decision however has proven to be an empty promise: in 2004 Samoa reported that "nothing had changed". 84 The above analysis demonstrates that current WTO rules are unfair to developing states. However, aside from issues regarding inequity in current rules, a further question arises: is the reduction of barriers to trade likely to alleviate poverty? 85 The effect of free trade on economic growth is often presumed. 86 However, global statistics are unclear on this issue. A 2005 report by the World Bank concedes that the correlation between trade liberalisation and economic growth is inconclusive. 87 The evidence of the effect of free trade on poverty alleviation is also unclear. There has not been a huge or consistent reduction in absolute poverty. 88 However, freer trade has apparently accompanied greater inequality both between and within states, 89 though it is uncertain whether that inequality has been caused by globalisation. 90 Extreme inequality breeds resentment, and is socially unsustainable. 91 Premature liberalisation is counterproductive and even disastrous in some circumstances. The dismantling of trade barriers inevitably destroys certain local industries. The consequent social dislocation of affected workers causes significant detriment to their economic and social rights, such as the right to work and to an adequate standard of living. 92 Poorer states are often unable to provide for any alternative work or compensation for such workers. The World Bank, despite its enthusiastic support for economic liberalism in the Pacific Islands, has conceded that Pacific industries could suffer hugely with increased competition, while the birth of new industries might take venue has been recovered by developing states through other means in the generate very low returns for producers. 98 Workers in the low-skilled manufacturing sector can be time. 93 The reduction of tariffs in developing states is problematic. In the Pacific Island States, tariffs constitute twenty to fifty per cent of government revenues. 94 Tariffs are relatively simple to collect: many developing states lack the infrastructure to properly police collection of other taxes, such as consumption taxes or income taxes. 95 States need to target and nurture niche industries to ensure the development of dynamic and sustainable comparative advantages, or they will probably remain poor. 100 The industrial capacity of developed states and the South East Asian "tiger economies" were nurtured by protectionist policies prior to trade liberalisation. 101 Many of the methods used successfully to foster development in such states, such as targeted protectionism, reverse engineering, and requirements for investors to source goods from local providers, are no longer permitted under the WTO. 102 States should also develop infrastructure to cope with the inevitable social consequences of liberalisation, 103 and to develop a skilled and productive workforce, so as to eventually be able to maximise their benefits from trade liberalisation. 104 Therefore, a slow and sequenced approach to liberalisation in underdeveloped nations, so as to allow them to build the domestic economic and social platforms needed to cope with and reap the benefits of a liberal trade regime, is preferable to premature liberalisation. 105 Such policy space is not however allowed under current WTO rules. 106 
IV CONCLUSION: A NEW DEAL?
There are strong arguments in favour of a new asymmetric deal that redresses the procedural and substantive imbalances of the Marrakesh Agreement in favour of states with vulnerable economies, 107 such as the Pacific Island members, incorporating for example the opening of agricultural markets by developed states and increased policy space for poorer states (such as TRIPS relief). While such a deal might seem politically unlikely, one may note that developed states would accrue some benefits from such a deal, such as goodwill for future trade negotiations (a far cry from the current gridlock) and cheaper goods for their consumers. 108 Greater latitude for policies that promote "non-trade" issues such as human rights, labour standards, food safety, and environmental pro ows developing states to tail accession unt tection, when they impact on trade, should also be allowed. 109 Again, such concessions would redress possible biased outcomes generated by biased processes, which disadvantage non-trade constituencies.
Such proposals of course might encourage states to lapse into protectionist strategies, undermining economic efficiency. Developing states could abuse their increased latitude, while all states could seek to defend protectionist laws by resort to excuses based on "non-trade" arguments. 110 However, world economic patterns have simply not conformed to orthodox theoretical expectations. 111 It is legitimate to call for an approach that all or economic strategies to their specific development needs, and allows states to be able to reasonably regulate to promote important "non-trade" agendas in areas of social justice. 112 "Fear of protectionism" should not be treated as an end that trumps other interests.
The many Pacific Islands that are not yet parties to the WTO must be mindful of the dangers of premature liberalisation, as well as the unfairness of the negotiating process for acceding states. Membership of the WTO should not be bought at any price. It may be worthwhile to delay il the remaining large economies, such as Russia and Iran, have concluded their accession protocols. WTO members may be more willing to offer concessions to the Pacific Islands when they are confident that those concessions will not be expected by more powerful states.
Finally, one may note that economic globalisation has been the subject of civil society campaigns across the world for over a decade. However, it is a relatively new topic in the Pacific. Pacific NGOs are not particularly well versed in the technicalities of economic globalisation and WTO law. There is an urgent need for greater expertise to provide an alternative voice for the ear of Pacific governments, who are being advised by powerful neighbour states as well as international institutions, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and Asia Development Bank to liberalise their economies and join the WTO. Pacific governments should at least be exposed to serious arguments that the price of membership may be too high. In that respect, the formation of the Pacific Network on Globalisation in 2001 was an important step towards greater informed dialogue on globalisation in the Pacific. 
